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The Geography of Multiple Scarcities: 
Urban Development and Water Problems in Lima, Peru 
 
Abstract: The paper discusses the contradictory evolution of water services and the 
politicised nature of water scarcity in Lima, the capital of Peru. It initially claims that water 
scarcity cannot be understood as an isolated phenomenon, but it is inserted in a wider 
multiplicity of scarcities that characterise contemporary urban development. The 
naturalisation of scarcity in the official policy discourse is then criticised for its tendency to 
overlook interconnected mechanisms of political differentiation and socioeconomic 
exploitation that influence the allocation and use of water. Against such reductionist readings, 
the analysis employs a non-essentialist interpretation of multiple scarcities related to water 
and emphasises the need to address the totality of the experience of scarcity. Based on 
qualitative fieldwork, which explored recent institutional reforms and the daily struggle for 
water in the periphery of Lima, three fundamental reasons were identified for the persistence 
of water scarcity: first, the expansion of water problems as a result of the poor quality of 
housing and the discriminatory practices against low-income residents; second, the modest 
improvements in water services provided by public investment programmes, which have 
primarily aimed to answer political and electoral demands of the ruling party; and third, the 
technocratic basis of new management approaches and the systematic exclusion of grassroots 
communities from the decision-making process. Genuine responses to the mounting water 
problems of Lima require a more critical appreciation of the production of circumstantial 
abundances and totalising scarcities in the city. 
 
Keywords: scarcity, water supply, urban policies, political ecology, water services, multiple 
scarcities, Lima, Peru 
 
1. Introduction: Urban water scarcity 
 
The water problems of Lima, the capital of Peru, have become commonplace in the 
global debate over urban water scarcity. The struggle to provide water for more than nine 
million people has attracted growing attention from academics (e.g. Chevallier et al., 2011; 
Fernández-Maldonado, 2008), multilateral agencies (e.g. UNDP, 2006; UNESCO, 2006) and 
international initiatives (e.g. projects Liwa and Switch).1 A comprehensive assessment of the 
water services of Lima has recently highlighted the seriousness of the deficit between supply 
and demand, aggravated by the high rates of urban expansion and environmental change 
(SEDAPAL, 2005). Furthermore, there is evidence of reductions in the average flow of the 
three local rivers between 1992 and 2004 (19.5% of the Chillón, 13.3% of the Rímac and 
33.0% of the Lurín) and of the dwindling storage of water in upstream reservoirs between 
                                                 
1 Liwa (http://www.lima-water.de); Switch (http://www.switchurbanwater.eu/index.php). 
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2000 and 2004 (Seifert, 2009). That grim situation was vividly reported in the BBC News 
article “Peru’s Alarming Water Truth”, which nonetheless focused mainly on the melting 
glaciers in the Andes and the expected reduction in water availability for the metropolitan 
region.2 Its author argues that “Peru’s water problem lies in part in the peculiar geography of 
the country”, which has more than seventy per cent of the population living along the semi-
arid coast where only two per cent of the nation’s water reserves are found. Mounting water 
scarcity is described in the article as a serious barrier to economic growth and, in the words of 
local political leader, “how on earth can we develop Peru in a sustainable way over the 
coming years [without a reliable supply of water]?” 
If it is important to acknowledge the trend of water management problems in Lima, it 
is also significant to observe that water scarcity has been largely interpreted, as the above 
examples illustrate, as the result of very low rates of rainfall, river degradation, groundwater 
depletion and aggregate population growth. There has been limited scholarly work on the 
intricate synergies and spatialised connections between multiple forms of scarcity and the 
associated production of contained, temporary forms of abundance that underpin water 
problems. The scarcity of water is certainly a physical phenomenon, but it is also the result of 
the intersection between poverty and inequality. In this article we claim that, rather than a 
process that happens in isolation, the geography of water scarcity in Lima has been shaped by 
the politicised basis of resource allocation, use and conservation. The scarcity of natural 
resources, such as water, is not external to social relations, but is a collective violence 
perpetrated by some social groups against other members of society. Particularly in the 
context of disorganised urban development, a condition of water scarcity acts like a mirror 
reflecting back social inequalities and spatial disputes. Taking into account the compound 
causes and effects of water scarcity, the contribution of this paper is to demonstrate that water 
                                                 
2 Available on 12 Mar 2007 at: http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/americas/6412351.stm  
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scarcity is synergistically connected with multiple other material and sociopolitical 
deficiencies which concurrently produce the total experience of scarcity.  
This paper deals more specifically with the economic, managerial and political 
sources of water scarcity problems in Lima and the effectiveness of governmental responses 
in the two recent decades. It will be argued that the essentialisation of the causes of water 
scarcity has permeated most policies, official assessments and investment plans. The 
naturalisation of scarcity, however, has led to technocratic and apparently consensual 
solutions that, in the end, only perpetuate mechanisms of social differentiation and political 
manipulation. Those initiatives, rather than overcoming it, have further consolidated the 
symbolic and lived dimensions of water scarcity. The persistence of water scarcity provides 
an important entry point into the failures of urban policies and socioeconomic development. 
The intricacies of the local circumstances of Lima also serve as a compelling case study for 
questioning the conceptual and empirical treatment of scarcity more generally. In spite of 
human development being a perennial struggle against social scarcities (Sartre, 1976), there 
still exist a large number of disparate interpretations of the core meaning of scarcity. Even 
economists, for whom scarcity is the cornerstone of the profession, typically deploy a 
mechanical understanding of the implications of scarcity due to the supposed substitutability 
between resources and capitals (Perelman, 2007). Such superficial conceptualisations of 
scarcity have the convenient consequence of moving the debate away from political economy 
and “the brutal realities of actually existing capitalism” (Panayotakis, 2011: 108).   
Our examination of water scarcity in Peru is based on fieldwork carried out in 2009, 
which included policy analysis, archival research and 54 in-depth interviews with local 
residents, regulators, policy-makers and parliamentarians, NGO activists, workers and 
managers of the water utility, and representatives of multilateral agencies. The fieldwork was 
appropriately conducted in a moment of apparent plenty of water because of the 
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announcement of new contracts and construction works. Two communities were selected for 
the study (Villa El Salvador and Huaycán, respectively in the south and east areas of the city) 
due to their historical relevance in terms of housing development and demands for improved 
water services, as well as because of the presence of established community networks and 
local NGOs. Interviews were transcribed, coded and translated by the author. Public policies 
and government documents, including material gathered after the actual fieldwork, were also 
analysed and contrasted with the discourse of the low-income population and the organised 
groups of protest. By combining the various sources of information it was possible to 
reconstruct the multidimensional, politicised relations that produce and maintain the 
experience of water scarcity. The empirical results reveal how the daily struggle for survival, 
against the odds of a large metropolitan area, requires persistent and creative coping 
strategies to secure household water. Furthermore, the fragile basis of the expansion of water 
supply in Lima contains the germ of further conflicts and new scarcities.  
 
2. Scarcity and abundance: Contested droplets of truth  
 
2.1. A non-essentialist interpretation of water scarcity  
 
It borders on tautology to observe that water is unequally distributed and unevenly 
used across the surface of the planet. Quite often water supply fails to meet demand for 
shorter or longer periods of time, therefore producing a situation of water scarcity that can be 
localised or more geographically widespread. However, without denying the important 
climatic, geological and hydrological factors, the primary cause determining scarcity is the 
way water is actually managed (Rees, 1982). Water scarcity is a relational condition that 
arises out of socionatural interactions in time, space and scale. The scarcity of water in semi-
arid Sicily, for example, does not derive from low rainfall alone, but it is mainly the outcome 
of disjointed, incomplete and often malfunctioning techno-natural networks (Giglioli and 
Swyngedouw, 2008). Likewise in Syria water scarcity has been produced and naturalised 
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through economic development policies and the political agenda of the ruling Ba’th party 
(Barnes, 2009). Nonetheless, a large number of official documents and technical assessments 
still tend to neglect the relational and politicised basis of resource scarcity and limit the 
analysis to the (utilitarian) balance between supply and demand (e.g. Baumgärtner et al., 
2006; Homer-Dixon, 1994). According to the mainstream orthodoxy, the scarcity of water is 
the result of a combination of physical insufficiencies, environmental determinism and 
imperfect, costly market transactions. The unavailability of water has been interpreted by the 
theorists of ecological modernisation as the failure to capture its monetary value and to 
realise its full economic potential (Ioris, 2010). Common property institutions are also held 
responsible for the wasteful use of natural resources, whereas free-market responses and 
private property regimes are seen as the answer to the risks posed by environmental 
degradation and ensuing scarcity (Matthew and Gaulin, 2001).  
The array of regulatory toolkits included in the new water legislation – such as water 
licences, user fees, payment for ecosystem services and utility privatisation – are all 
rationalised in relation to rising levels of scarcity (Kaika, 2003; Loftus, 2006). Because it is 
defined as scarce, water is reontologised by the hegemonic groups as an economic resource 
and becomes susceptible to the same rationality (i.e. production for the market) that was 
paradoxically responsible for the sources of scarcity in the first place (see Swyngedouw, 
2004). Mainstream interpretations thus operate within a narrow techno-bureaucratic episteme 
(Ioris, 2008) in which scarcity emerges as a ‘meta-narrative’ that justifies simplistic solutions 
to conflicts and disputes (Mehta, 2007). The ordinary symbolism of scarcity ultimately 
represents a political rallying point around which administrative networks emerge and are 
perpetuated (Alatout, 2009). This reductionist focus on physical scarcity and on the purely 
economic responses obfuscates, rather than illuminates, the understanding of the natural 
resource scarcity. As pointed out by Harvey (1974: 272), the scarcity of resources 
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presupposes certain social ends and “it is these that define scarcity just as much as the lack of 
natural means to accomplish these ends”. Paraphrasing Marx (1956: 51) we can argue that 
scarcity and abundance are opposite poles that form a single whole, while the crucial question 
is the position that each one occupies in the antithesis.  
We therefore submit that water scarcity should be understood from a non-essentialist 
perspective. It means that scarcity cannot be described in absolute and aprioristic terms, but it 
is the result of intricate relations between human groups and their socionatural circumstances. 
In the Hegelian sense (Hegel, 2008), there is already a logical development of resource 
scarcity in unequal societies, insofar as it renders itself concrete due to the asymmetrical 
distribution of opportunities between social groups and classes. A non-essentialist 
interpretation rejects scarcity as a purely physical and economic phenomenon, but emphasises 
the contingency of sociospatial relations that affect the allocation and use of resources. A 
non-essentialist understanding of the allocation and use of natural resources is associated with 
what Panayotakis (2003: 90) describes as the dialectics of scarcity, something that is inherent 
in the contradictory basis of capitalist societies: “the capitalist economic process that 
reproduces scarcity artificially also enriches human needs and creates the preconditions for 
overcoming scarcity”. It is relevant here to recall that classical political economists, such as 
Marx, already identified an intrinsic association between the structure of market institutions 
and environmental degradation, in the sense that scarcity derives from the way capitalism 
relates to nature (Perelman, 1996). Marx examined the balance of power involved in the 
private appropriation of the ‘forces of nature’, such as water features, that are marshalled for 
rent-seeking and for the overarching accumulation of surplus value. Marx further observed 
that those who own a waterfall are in a position to “exclude those who do not from using this 
natural force, because land, and particularly land endowed with water power is scarce” 
(quoted in Harvey, 2006: 336).  
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By acknowledging the non-essentialist origins of scarcity, it is possible to go beyond 
simplistic descriptions of resource shortage and open up the possibility of creatively 
addressing the causes and consequences of water scarcity. In particular, it should be noted 
that the persistence of scarcity in capitalist societies is in effect closely relate to the expansion 
of a specific model of economic growth and national development according to the Western 
‘project’ of modernity (Habermas, 1981). A condition of resource scarcity is contingent upon 
specific socionatural interactions and the broader, historical relations of production and 
reproduction more broadly. Although it is certainly possible to identify at the centre of 
Western modernity the pursuit and realisation of scarcities (Xenos, 1989), we should also 
recognise that the goals of modernity are not a monopoly of the Western society (Robinson, 
2006). For instance, in Latin America, the expansion of the modernist project has never been 
completed, but conflicting views of modernisation co-existed and have been even displaced 
by post-modernist environmental sensitivities, often imposed by donor agencies (see Laurie 
and Marvin, 1999).3 Scarcity, as much as modernity, is a contested concept that needs to be 
critically reinterpreted in order to understand the failures and the prospects of allocating and 
using water more fairly. 
 
2.2. Multiple scarcities and the urban space 
 
The foregoing non-essentialist conceptualisation of water scarcity is even more 
clearly demonstrated in the context of urban development. The city is a mosaic of places and 
locations where water is unevenly stored, processed, conveyed, used, wasted and recollected 
according to a range of socioeconomic relations and political interactions. The contemporary 
city is a locale that presupposes renewed forms of scarcity, which nurture novel opportunities 
for the circulation of capital (through investments, management and tariffs) and the 
endorsement of political power (through the promise and the administration of scarcity-relief 
                                                 
3 Many thanks to an anonymous referee for this observation.  
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schemes). In the words of Swyngedouw (2004: 30), “the mechanisms of exclusion from and 
access to water manifest the power relationships through which the geography of cities is 
shaped and transformed”. Furthermore, when considering the dilemmas of contemporary 
urban development, Lefebvre (2003: 161) observed that “urbanism provides a presentiment 
of new scarcities” and it raises the prospects of exploring them according to the balance of 
power. For Lefebvre, the city is the realm of manifold scarcities, such as scarce space, time, 
desire and elements (not only water, but air, earth, the sun), whose management encapsulates 
inequalities and is instrumental in the perpetuation of exploitation. As a result, there exist a 
number of concurrent forms of scarcity associated with water, which are also the outcome of 
sustained forms of inequality and discrimination. It is the combination of converging 
manifestations of scarcity that ultimately serves to reinforce policy failures and the 
precariousness of public water services. 
Particularly in the megacities of the Global South, the cartography of water scarcity 
closely follows the legacy of colonial rule and the troubles of post-colonial development. 
Water distribution problems are often more severe in zones occupied by deprived populations 
and in areas where the communities are weak and unable to exert political influence. That 
condition calls for a conceptualisation that adequately connects the pattern of water services 
with the concrete suffering of marginalised sectors of urban society. Such a framework 
should be able to address the complexity of the city and situate water scarcity in relation to 
the synergistic effects of other important forms of economic, political and social deficiencies. 
In that regard, the concept of multiple scarcities provides the needed analytical device to 
understand the persistence of water problems in the city in a broader context of cumulative 
problems. Water scarcity is not a single, monothematic phenomenon but it must be decoded 
as the locus of various intervening scarcities, including those derived from enclosed and 
circumstantial forms of abundance (for example, the construction of expensive households 
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with high rates of water use in cities already suffering from the lack of water services in low-
income areas). Consequently, the scarcity of water should be treated as a plural, compounded 
phenomenon, something that is also an integral factor in the formation and replication of 
highly asymmetric social landscapes. The multiple forms of scarcity have many repercussions 
for the social production of space, especially in large cities where the convergence of 
manifold forms of scarcity becomes the prevailing pattern of the lived space. In those 
situations, interpersonal and domestic forms of discrimination, as in the case of the female 
members of poor homes who are often put in charge of fetching water for the family (Laurie, 
2011), typically add another layer to the overall association of multiple scarcities in deprived 
areas. 
It should also be observed that previous studies dedicated to the examination of 
multiple scarcities have provided only a superficial discussion of the same phenomenon. For 
instance, Homer-Dixon (1991) presents a neo-Malthusian argument to describe the 
interactive and feedback effects of simultaneous shortages of resources and environmental 
degradation. According to this interpretation, unsustainable practices, population growth and 
structural failures are cumulative factors that interact in ways that create or exacerbate 
multiple scarcities. Similarly, Buxton et al. (2003) affirm that multiple scarcities are a 
problem when they prevent the advance of market-based solutions for the development of the 
region and the resolution of pending socioenvironmental degradation. Departing from such 
teleological conceptualisations of multiple scarcities, which fall short of addressing the 
underlying synergies between physical, social and political processes, we contend that the 
explanation of water scarcity requires both a non-essentialist perspective and the 
identification of multiple, synergistic mechanisms of inclusion and exclusion. Those two 
concepts – i.e. non-essentialist and multiple water scarcities – have important implications for 
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urban geographical investigations and indicate the importance of considering the totality of 
scarcity, as we see next.  
 
2.3. The totality of the experience of scarcity 
 
By taking into account the non-essentialist interpretation of water scarcity and the 
intersection of multiple scarcities that helps to produce the urban space, it is possible to 
realise that situations of water scarcity are experienced together with the violation of 
socioeconomic rights and the unavailability of other important resources and services. The 
production of urban water scarcity arises from mechanisms of political differentiation and 
spatial inequality that intervene in the allocation and use of resources and opportunities. In 
that context, the presence of one form of scarcity (for example, limited housing rights or 
restricted political representation) directly and indirectly compromises the mitigation of other 
forms of scarcity (such as water). In other words, the scarcity of water is constantly recreated 
and reaffirmed by the existence of simultaneous and synergistic expressions of scarcity. The 
specific level of suffering depends on the status and position of individuals and communities, 
but the scarcity of water is always part of the totality of the experience of scarcity. For 
instance, the distress caused by the insufficiency of water is often experienced with 
environmental degradation and social exclusion, which together generate an integral 
sensuous-emotional experience in the everyday lives of urban dwellers. In the words of 
Lukács (1971: 10), the concrete totality is the category that actually governs reality. The 
category of totality helps to determine not only the object of knowledge, but also the subjects 
and how they are posited in the totality. The consequence is that “the destruction of a 
totalising point of view disrupts the unity of theory and practice” (Lukács, 1971: 39). This 
last statement has important practical implications for the examination and response to urban 
problems, such as, in our case, the sociospatial production of water scarcity. 
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The claims made above will inform our analysis and understanding of the scarcities 
associated with water in the Peruvian capital city. The recognition of the politicised basis of 
the totality of the experience of scarcity is central for examination of problems and potential 
solutions to the actual shortcomings of local water management in Lima. Historically, the 
relatively limited water reserves along the semi-arid coast of Peru did not prevent the 
indigenous people from cultivating large extensions of irrigated fields and constructing 
several pyramids in the area that is now the metropolitan region of Lima (Conlee et al., 
2004). However, since the early days of colonisation, water management had been translated 
into a constant struggle to tame the local hydrology and satisfy, in highly asymmetric ways, 
the demands of the growing population. In more recent years, the multiplicity of urban 
scarcities has been managed through social and political dislocations that simultaneously 
bring new forms of selective abundance and generalise the experience of scarcity. That is, the 
totality of the experience of scarcity has not been negated by the emergence of localised, 
circumstantial forms of abundance in the wealthier neighbourhoods or during government 
investment programmes. On the contrary, the multiple scarcities of Lima have been 
repeatedly reinforced through institutional reforms and government initiatives carried out 
under the discourse of universal water services, as we begin to examine. 
 
3. The geography of multiple scarcities related to water in Lima  
 
The empirical section of this paper applies the non-essentialist interpretation of the 
multiple, interrelated scarcities related to water in order to address the totality of the 
experience of scarcity in Lima. Based on fieldwork that explored institutional reforms, 
sectoral disputes and the daily struggle for water in the periphery of the city, three 
fundamental aspects of the reinforcement of water scarcity in the city were identified, 
namely: a) the evolution of water problems as a result of scarce housing supply for the poor 
(due to the exclusionary priorities of urban and national development); b) the misleading and 
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ephemeral nature of the abundances created by recent governmental programmes (primarily 
aimed to answer to political and electoral demands); and c) the technocratic basis of new 
management approaches and the systematic exclusion of grassroots communities.  
 
3.1 The interrelated scarcities of water and housing 
 
The evolution of the water problems of Lima reveals a multiplicity of scarcities 
entangled in the production of the urban space. The low rates of rainfall along the semi-arid 
Peruvian coast (around 25 mm/year, cf. Vince, 2010) were a matter of serious concern for the 
colonial authorities already at the foundation of the capital in the early 16th century. Public 
water supply was restricted to the manor houses, convents and official buildings that 
controlled the production and export of precious metals (silver in particular). Water was 
mainly abstracted from the small River Rímac and distributed through a combination of 
public fountains and private water vendors, who normally employed slaves and donkeys to 
carry water through the streets of the city (the so-called aguateros, see SEDAPAL, 2003). 
Disputes involving the water access were resolved by the Dedicated Water Tribunal (Juzgado 
Privativo de Aguas), established in Lima in 1556 to deal with matters involving the landed 
nobility, the clergy and artisanal industrialists (according to our research in the Archivo 
General de la Nación, Lima, March 2009). The formal provision of public water services 
began in the 1850s, with the sudden, but circumstantial availability of state funds for 
investments in pipelines during the guano bonanza that lasted between 1845 and 1880 (Miller 
and Greenhill, 2006). Lima attracted more and more people in search of jobs and 
opportunities, but the low-income migrants could only find accommodation in old derelict 
buildings or under improvised constructions in the colonial centre with no running water 
(Bertram, 1991). The transfer of large numbers of people to Lima also served as an antidote 
against claims for agrarian reform and scarcity of agriculture land in the provinces (Collier, 
1976). 
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Because of the limited number of affordable homes available for the working class 
and the poor migrants, an entire ‘illegal city’ was created within and around the more central 
areas (Calderón Cockburn, 2005). As in most of the continent, city expansion was 
particularly significant between the 1950s and 1970s, when the rate of demographic growth 
reached more than 5% per year (IMP, 1989). Industrialisation in Peru followed the traditional 
pattern of import substitution, only later and at a lesser scale than the larger Latin American 
economies (Wise, 2003). During the government of President Odría (1948-1956), a total of 
3,500 houses were built, which was insufficient to accommodate the 30,000 or 50,000 new 
migrants that were arriving in the city every year (Driant, 1991). The growing number of 
squatter settlements – known locally as barriadas – became the main alternative to the 
incoming population of Lima. The barriada is a form of urbanisation where first a plot of 
land is obtained (normally by occupying a public or private area) for the construction of 
dwellings and where urban services, including water, arrive only much later, if ever (Barreda 
and Ramirez Corzo, 2004). The water treatment plant of La Atarjea was inaugurated in 1956 
with the capacity to produce 5 m3/s, then considered to be one of the largest in the world 
(SEDAPAL, 2003), but still barely serving the metropolitan areas that contained the wealthier 
neighbourhoods, government buildings and industries. According to the office of national 
statistics, in the 1960s Lima contained 67% of the national industries, which contributed to 
aggravate the already serious condition of water shortage in the capital. 
The administration of President Prado (1956-1962) had to accept the barriadas as the 
new inescapable reality of Lima and instructed public agencies, as well as universities, to 
assist the settlers to build their homes even in non-regularised areas. At the same time, the 
liberal government of Prado supported private housing construction projects to serve the also 
swelling needs of the middle classes. With the obvious impossibility of attending to the 
increasing demand for houses, the barriadas then became an unavoidable feature of the urban 
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expansion of Lima and their tacit acceptance was a form of ‘implicit agreement’ between the 
state and the poor to allow peripheral informal settlements.4 The formation of the barriadas 
was no longer only a spontaneous process initiated by the population in the face of scarce 
urban space, but was gradually transformed into a semi-official policy for dealing with the 
uncontrollable rates of city expansion. A new law in 1961 defined the legal status of the 
existing barriadas and provided the legal framework to integrate squatter settlements to the 
city (through a process called ‘physical and legal regularisation’). The crucial role played by 
the barriadas in the urbanisation of Lima was recognised by authors like Turner (1967) as a 
viable alternative to the growing lack of residences in the capital. Turner and others saw the 
dynamic and creative nature of the barriadas as a form of ‘self-help’, something that should 
be supported and legalised rather than simply condemned.  Under the state capitalism policies 
of General Velasco (1968-1975), there was an evident reduction in the construction of regular 
houses and a tacit tolerance of the expansion of the barriadas (described by Riofrío, 1978, as 
‘double-sided policy’). Between 1960 and 1968, 111 new barriadas were established in Lima, 
especially in the so-called North Cone of the capital (Calderón Cockburn, 2005). The military 
government also systematically tried to contain political protests and to domesticate popular 
organisation through the activity of SINAMOS (National Social Mobilisation System), a 
government-sponsored social mobilisation agency aimed to control public participation 
(Lloyd, 1980). The scarcity of houses was, thus, mitigated through the ascent of the barriada 
as an inevitable feature of the emerging metropolis of Lima, but at the expense of political 
freedom and the ability to criticise the work of public authorities.  
The barriada was officially renamed by the military government as ‘new settlement’ 
(pueblo jóven) and, in the 1970s, the expansion turned towards the South Cone. In 1976, 
Lima had 319 barriadas (188 barriadas were created between 1968 and 1980), which then 
                                                 
4 Another helpful point made by an anonymous referee. 
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contained a population of almost one and a half million people (Calderón Cockburn, 2005). 
The distinctive disparity between the water supply to central settlements and to the barriadas 
remained evident, despite some significant improvement in the 1970s due to sustained 
grassroots protests and concessions from the national government (Zolezzi and Calderón, 
1987). Table 1 provides an overview of the expansion of services and the persistence of 
problems and inequalities in the period. In the 1980s, the main axis of expansion became the 
East Cone, as well as the borders to the other cones, with most of the new residents no longer 
migrating from the inland of the country, but from the older barriadas where houses were 
becoming increasingly scarce (Driant, 1991). The national and metropolitan branches of the 
state were increasingly powerless to deal with the constant spread of the city and the rising 
level of economic informality, which was defined by Matos Mar (2004) as a phenomenon of 
‘popular overflow’. Furthermore, because of the ineffectiveness of the state, the barriadas of 
Lima were converted into one of the main battlefields between leftist terrorist groups and the 
military forces, which only served to make the expansion of water infrastructure even more 
difficult. Movements such as the Maoist Shining Path found in the barriadas a safe option to 
hide and plan subversive activities, although they also faced systematic and organised 
opposition from local groups of residents, as in the case of neighbourhood security 
committees that established some collaboration with the local police (Kruijt and Degregori, 
2007). 
Table 1.  
Uneven Evolution of Water Supply Between Regular Neighbourhoods and the Barriadas of Lima (1972-1981) 
 
 
For more than half century since the 1930s, the urban perimeter of Lima had 
undergone a rapid process of expansion but the investments in the water system remained 
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largely localised. The prevailing tone of the (mainly reactive and tardy) water policies was 
the conversion of the responses to scarcity into a scarcity of responses. To be sure, as part of 
the process of industrial growth and economic development, minimal volumes of freshwater 
needed to be provided to the urban population to secure, at least, the maintenance and 
reproduction of the workforce. But the provision of water services still occupied only a 
secondary place in the structure of public administration. It was only in 1962 that public 
water services were reorganised as a metropolitan utility, which received its current 
denomination, SEDAPAL (Drinking Water and Sewerage Service of Lima), as recently as 
1981. In the early 1980s, around 20% of the population still relied on private water vendors 
and, among those with access to public services, 40.6% suffered from intermittent supply; 
50% of treated water was lost due to leakage and illicit connections (Zolezzi and Calderón, 
1987). The persistent problems with the supply of safe water deteriorated further with the 
macroeconomic turbulence and political instability under President García (1985-1990). The 
fact that water services became increasingly precarious was an integral part of the production 
of a generalised condition of scarcity in the city (Dietz, 1998). This context of political and 
economic turmoil led to the unexpected election of Fujimori (1990-2000), a political outsider 
who soon started to implement a package of comprehensive neoliberal policies. Despite the 
gradual recovery of the economy in the 1990s (which nonetheless led to higher 
unemployment and lower wages, see Wise, 2003), the occupation of new areas, in old and 
new barriadas, remained the main resort available to a large proportion of newcomers or 
second generation residents (Portes and Roberts, 2005). In the period between 1993 and 
1998, 208 additional barriadas were established and mainly occupied steep slopes prone to 
erosion and landslides.  
During most of the 20th century, ill-planned, hasty urbanisation followed the pattern 
of land shortage and guaranteed the perennial continuation of multiple scarcities, including 
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the shortage of housing and the lack of water. If in 1956 the barriadas of Lima 
accommodated 10% of the population (119,140 residents), in 1993 they contained 34.4% of 
the population (1.9 million residents), according to Calderón Cockburn (2005). In 2004, the 
barriadas reached 43.4% of the metropolitan population or more than 3.5 million people 
(CONAM, 2004). Nowadays, the poorest neighbourhoods still concentrate the higher 
proportion of the population not served by public water services, although even in the 
wealthier areas it is possible to find pockets of houses without access and depending on 
alternative sources of water. As can be seen in Table 2, the legacy of urban development is 
still apparent in terms of unequal water supply across different levels of household income. 
Some economic growth achieved since the introduced of state reforms in 1990 was mainly 
translated into material benefits only for the small urban elite at the expense of an increasing 
sociospatial discrimination. The more than three million residents of the barriadas regularly 
undergo a sense of uncertainty that derives from the fast rate of urban transformation, the 
explosion of mass consumption values, the precarious labour market and serious levels of 
violence (Grampone, 1999; Joseph, 2004; Kruijt and Degregori, 2007). It is in the context of 
uncertainty and vulnerability that the recent initiatives of water management in Lima have 
been introduced, which have significantly increased the monetary and technological 
symbolism of water but also left the origins of the multiple scarcities virtually unchanged.  
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Table 2.  
Relation between Income and Water Supply in Selected Municipalities of Lima (year 2007). Source: INEI and 
SEDAPAL databases; compiled by the author. 
 
 
3.2 (Neoliberal) state initiatives and the persistence of problems 
 
As discussed above, the water problems of Lima were gradually aggravated by the 
overall situation of scarce homes and partial integration of the incoming migrants into the 
economy and society of the city. The magnitude of the problems became even more evident 
when an outbreak of cholera erupted in 1991 in Lima, after a century without similar 
incidents. The epidemic was caused by an inadequate public health infrastructure and 
microbial contamination of water supplies (Tickner and Gouveia-Vigeant, 2005). After a long 
period without investments, the poor performance of the water supply and sanitation services 
provided the political justification for the Fujimori administration to include SEDAPAL in 
the list of public utilities to be privatised. SEDAPAL was then seen as a company with 
inadequate system maintenance, a high level of unaccounted-for water, excess staff, low 
metering rates and low water quality, at the same time that the national state was portrayed as 
unable to resolve the trend of problems and in need of the private sector (Corton, 2003). The 
centrality of scarcity in the reports and assessments during that phase – rather than the more 
politicised concepts of poverty, dispossession and unfairness – was a clear indication of the 
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preference for technocratic responses and private sector involvement (for instance, described 
by World Bank, 1994). In other words, the grim condition of the water services transformed 
scarcity from a problem into an outstanding opportunity for market-based solutions. More 
significantly, the plan to privatise the water utility of Lima was the implicit recognition of 
financial and technical scarcities as the emerging drivers of urban policy-making.  
Among the neoliberal policies advanced by the Fujimori administration there was the 
intention to privatise the water utility of Lima. For the market-oriented technocrats who were 
managing the privatisation process, the participation of private companies in the water 
services of Lima was highly desirable under the justification that it would restore business 
confidence, remove the obstacles to modernisation, improve services and eliminate a fiscal 
drain (Alcázar et al., 2000). The perceived scarcity of water in Lima prompted, somehow 
paradoxically, a sudden abundance of money used to prepare SEDAPAL to be privatised, 
which came from reductions in labour costs, higher consumer tariffs and a financing package 
of US$ 600 million provided by the World Bank and other agencies (Alcázar et al., 2000). 
Following the publication of the tender notice in appropriate newspapers, three international 
consortiums prequalified to bid for the concession of the water service in November 1994. 
However, due to various operation and political problems, the process was postponed several 
times and eventually cancelled in 1997. The main reason for cancelling the privatisation was 
that its political price was not affordable to the president (the hesitation of the government to 
privatise SEDPAL was mentioned in several of our interviews; one interview pointed out that 
“the institutional context in the early 1990s was moving towards the privatisation of 
SEDAPAL, new legislation and the new regulatory agency [SUNASS] were introduced, but 
the ultimate goals of public policies was not the sustainability of services, but the political use 
of water... water is votes in Lima”; Interview, 16 May 2009). Because of the confrontational 
nature of the neoliberal reforms introduced by Fujimori, his popularity was declining 
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nationally and Lima was one of the main political strongholds in his campaign for re-election, 
so it was very risky to press forward with the privatisation.5 In 1995 Fujimori was re-elected 
and the management board of SEDAPAL embarked upon a second and larger programme of 
operational recovery independently of utility privatisation (at least in the near future).  
In effect, during Fujimori’s second term of office the water utility of Lima received 
considerable sums of public funds (it is estimated that reached US$ 2.44 billion, equivalent to 
14% of the public investment of the 1990s or 0.5% of the GDP) that were spent mainly on 
pipeline replacement and leakage control (SEDAPAL, 2005). Yet, water provision was still 
concentrated in the higher income areas, which had 40% of the population consuming 88% of 
the total water, while the poorer 60% only used 12% of the total (CENCA, 1998). In the more 
distant or hilly locations, where standard water infrastructure was too costly, a series of 
alternative projects were adopted with the help of NGOs and with international funding. The 
most notable initiative was APPJ (Water for New Settlements), which was specifically 
supported by the European Union (€ 12.3 m) and aimed to build 214 community systems 
comprised of a cistern, filled by water tankers, and distribution through hosepipes (Bonfiglio, 
2002). Those emergency solutions, however, did not prevent the operation of private water 
vendors; on the contrary, 70% of the population remained affected by intermittent service 
disruptions and had to systematically purchase water from private sellers (ICOM, 2001). If 
the poor residents were expected to purchase water in the black market the rate of salary 
increase was negative between 1995 and 2001 (-19.13%), at the same time that the rate of 
inflation achieved 58% in the same period; as a result, low-income residents had to spend 
48% of their earnings on food and drinking alone (data from Morales Saravia, 2005). 
With the abrupt end of the Fujimori government (under corruption scandals and other 
criminal allegations) and the gradual return to formal democracy under President Toledo 
                                                 
5 Similar political support in Lima was obtained years later by Keiko Fujimori, daughter of Alberto Fujimori, in 
the presidential elections of 05 June 2011 (eventually won by Ollanta Humala due to the majority of votes he 
managed to secure in the provinces). 
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(2001-2006), SEDAPAL faced a deteriorating financial situation (which reflected the 
macroeconomic problems in the country). Tariffs started to increase again and become a main 
dispute between SEDAPAL and the regulatory agency SUNASS (Bonifaz and Malásquez, 
2008). The average tariff rose from US$ 0.39/m3 in 2001 to US$ 0.77/m3 in 2008, an increase 
of 97.4% (Interview, SUNASS manager [National Sanitation Service Superintendence], 06 
May 2009). After initial instability, the economy resumed growth under Toledo, although the 
level of social poverty persisted significantly high at around 35% of the population of Lima 
(Morales Saravia, 2005). For those without access to mains water, the alternative continued to 
be the purchase from private water tankers.6 On average, poor families in the periphery could 
only afford 30 litres per capita per day in the private water market (by comparison, the 
average consumption in San Isidro, the wealthiest neighbourhood, was 405 l/day and supplied 
by the public water company; see more statistics in Grupo GEA, 2005).  
The long-lasting scarcity of water in Lima was perceived as a main electoral 
expedient in the 2006 presidential campaign and formed an important part of the promises 
made by the main candidates. In that process, and to the surprise of many analysts, Alan 
García, the previous nationalistic president, who had adopted a histrionic confrontation with 
the banking sector in the 1980s, won a second election and returned to office as a converted 
neoliberal. During the campaign, García had sensed the political significance of water 
scarcity in Lima and pledged to bring abundant water to the most distant corners of the 
capital (the candidate even used the eye-catching expression “without water there is no 
democracy”). Already in the second year of the government of Alan García, in 2007, the 
programme ‘Water for All’ (Agua para Todos or APT) was launched with a portfolio of 
projects for the metropolitan area of Lima that totalled more than US$ 2.3 billion (cf. 
SEDAPAL, 2007). See an outdoor advertisement of the programme in Figure 1. 
                                                 
6 303 water tankers were registered by the Ministry of Health in 1997 (CENCA, 1998). Ten years later, in 2007, 
there were still 800 tankers in operation (Fernández-Maldonado, 2008). 
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Figure 1. Advertisement of the Water for All Programme in Lima (picture taken outside the 
headquarters of SEDAPAL). 
 
Despite its rhetoric of social inclusion and democratisation of services, APT offers an 
emblematic example of the barriers and difficulties to deal with the scarcity of water in Lima 
(without changes in current management practices). On the one hand, the initiative was 
evidently welcomed by construction companies and private operators, who were eager to 
praise the ‘leadership’ of the Peruvian government (for example, on 03 Dec 2011, there were 
427 articles related to SEDAPAL on the website Business News America).7 Such level of 
interest is not surprising given that most of APT works are to be carried out through 
concessions to and partnerships with private companies. On the other hand, the circumstantial 
abundance of investments made available by President García failed to conceal the 
uncertainties about the future of the water sector of Lima. The billionaire budget of the APT 
                                                 
7 Website address: http://www.bnamericas.com 
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programme was in effect a combination of public sector surplus, foreign loans and private 
sector investments (the latter will have to be repaid, obviously, at a profit). The recovery of 
those investments was guaranteed by increased in water tariffs: 10.73% increase to pay for 
Marca II, Huachipa and North and South mains system and 12.31% to pay for Taboada and 
the Submarine Discharge Line (SUNASS, 2007). Even before the conclusion of those works, 
the utility’s income rose by 16% in 2008, compared with the previous year, due to more 
water being sold and additional micro-metering (SEDAPAL, 2008). SEDAPAL also 
registered 10% of the utility’s shares in the stock market of Lima as a supplementary 
assurance to the international banking system, foreign investors and private operators 
(SEDAPAL Communiqué on 10 Nov. 2009).   
Crucially, this combination of loans, investment contracts, tariff increases and stock 
market shares was only possible in a context of favourable global market conditions. There is 
no guarantee, however, that all the initiatives included in the APT will be effectively funded. 
At the same time, the overall approach to water management remains centred on supply 
augmentation according to the top-down priorities of the ruling government. Considering 
these two factors together, there is little room to believe that the momentary containment of 
water scarcity promoted by APT is going to respond to the long-term water problems of 
Lima. In the words of a former SUNASS officer:  
 
“We are in a situation of bonanza, lots of investments in water and some in sanitation. 
Or at least that is the image that the current government [García’s] is trying to convey. 
In a situation of plenty, alternatives and criticism diminish. But, in my opinion, we are 
ignoring the big problems that will mean new constraints in the water services, 
especially environmental degradation and climate change impacting the [Andean] 
glaciers. More important, the city remains without planning and management, keeps 
expanding and climbing the sandy hills” (Interview, 12 May 2009). 
 
The implementation of APT seems to operate within the same rationality of the 
ephemeral and demagogic initiatives that have historically maintained an overall condition of 
multiple scarcities related to water. A benchmarking study shows that public services are still 
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lagging behind the needs of the population: water supply serves 84.3% and sanitation 80.1% 
of the residents, while only 20.7% of sewage receives treatment (SUNASS, 2010). Despite 
the various investment programmes, the president of SEDAPAL had to concede, in May 
2011, that at least 157,000 families still did not have access to water and sanitation (Isasi 
Cayo, 2011). Most of those without public services are in the periphery of the city, but even 
in the consolidated neighbourhoods, approximately half of the houses receive treated water 
for only a few hours every day (SEDAPAL, 2005). Although the total number of water users 
continues to increase, there are limited efforts to save and recycle water. In addition, the rate 
of leakage and unaccounted for water also remains high (i.e. 38%) and there is limited 
opportunity to increase the abstraction of water from the River Rímac, as 82% of the annual 
water flow is already diverted to serve Lima (i.e. demand of 20.70 m3/s, between 1990 and 
2010, and average flow of 25.22 m3/s), as explained in an interview with a SEDAPAL 
manager (on 10 Apr 2009). That is particularly problematic given that the total production of 
treated water has been fairly constant since 1995 (Figure 2), which means a reduction in the 
average amount of water supply (due to population growth). Based on the official statistics 
(published by INEI and SEDAPAL), we calculated that the annual availability of treated 
water oscillated from 8.51 m3/inhabitant/year in 1986 to 6.97 m3 in 1990, 7.45m3 in 2000 and 
only 6.74 m3 in 2007. In the next section we will examine the contrast between the 
predominance of a technocratic rationale and the reaction of those more directly affected by 
water scarcity. 
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Figure 2. Monthly Production of Treated Water in Lima (data from INEI and SEDAPAL 
annual reports). 
 
3.3. The distance between technocratic interpretations and the lived experience of water 
scarcity 
 
The persistent condition of water scarcity is evidently not unknown to policy-makers 
and public authorities, as it was demonstrated in the interviews carried out during our 
research. Moreover, the focus of governmental policies and official speeches has frequently 
overlooked the multiple sources of the scarcity of water in Lima and has tended to 
concentrate on the need to build large-scale works with greater political visibility (e.g. 
SEDAPAL, 2005). In an attempt to improve those responses to the water problems of Lima, 
the multilateral agencies responsible for managing loans and cooperation programmes in Peru 
have insisted on a more efficient management of water utilities and on higher user charges 
and safeguards for private companies involved in public services (see, for example, the 
argument of the World Bank in PAS, 2001).8 A local representative of those agencies stated 
that the market-friendly adjustments of the Peruvian water sector seem to be going in the 
                                                 
8 This opinion closely follows the argument of the industry federation’s spokesperson, who strongly emphasised 
that, while the quantity of the water available in Lima seems satisfactory, the main problem is the populist 
manipulation of the water sector by politicians (Interview, 08 Apr 2009). 
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right direction, but also claimed that the way forward depends on regulatory improvements 
and institutional protection to attract more private companies to Peru (Author’s interview 
with a World Bank officer in Lima, 18 Mar 2009). In the words of a member of the German 
cooperation agency: 
 
“The water industry in Peru is relatively new, less than ten years, as an organised 
sector with dedicated institutional coordination, a proper ministry and legislation. (…) 
The main challenge is to reduce the political influence in the municipal level, train the 
technical staff, increase the market and the number of those that pay for water” 
(Interview, 22 Mar 2009).  
 
Both the responses formulated by national and international policy-makers maintain 
this technocratic and economic emphasis, which is often translated into large construction 
contracts and business management strategies that fail to engage with the everyday reality of 
the population most affected by water scarcity. Successive governmental interventions have 
systematically reinstated water scarcity as a physical problem that should be resolved 
basically through additional investments in infrastructure, higher tariffs and public-private 
partnerships. Following such a rationale, the multiple forms of scarcity associated with water 
are continually ignored and the consequence is a significant mistrust between SEDAPAL and 
the low-income population. The turbulent dialogue between the water utility and 
communities in the periphery of the city inevitably affects the search for alternative, water 
supply and sanitation technologies, which in theory could help to alleviate the deficit of 
services. For instance, since 2005 SEDAPAL tried to introduce the condominial system, a 
low cost, decentralised sanitation technology imported from Brazil that attains a cost 
reduction of up to 40%, which was systematically rejected by the local residents.9 Despite 
efforts by the engineers and other SEDAPAL officers to promote the condominial alternative, 
the residents refused to accept a technology that was perceived to be designed only for those 
that live in the barriadas and in similar marginalised areas. As stated in one interview, it 
                                                 
9 Condominial systems involve a connection by ‘blocks’ (rather than the traditional individualised connection).    
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“does not matter the technological argument, we saw it as a second-class solution that was 
being offered to second-class citizens” (Interview, local resident, 24 Apr 2009). Because of 
the tortuous dealings with the population, alternatives such as the condominial technology 
were virtually abandoned (in 2009, there were only 11 condominial systems in Lima). In spite 
of potential money savings, those contacted in our interviews had mixed feelings about the 
new technology. To be sure, some interviewees expressed their satisfaction with the 
condominial option, but most took a more critical approach and perceived it as ‘the 
alternative for the poor’, something that is intrinsically discriminatory as it was only adopted 
in the periphery of Lima.  
The difficulty in maintaining a good relation between SEDAPAL and the more needy 
communities is not helped by the negative image people have of the water utility, particularly 
because of several cases of corruption reported in the newspapers in recent years. The failure 
of additional investments and ingenious technologies demonstrates that scarcity is an 
outcome of deeply politicised processes of inclusion and exclusion, which is again 
appropriated as a powerful force in preserving established hierarchies and privileges. 
Infrastructure construction programmes, such as those introduced by Fujimori and the more 
recent APT under García, have mainly changed the aggregate statistics of water supply and, 
to a lesser extent, sanitation. In the meantime, serious problems continue to afflict low-
income households and marginalised communities, such as the unreliability of services, rising 
water tariffs and, ultimately, the persistent experience of multiple scarcities. Interestingly, the 
physical structure of the new headquarters of SEDAPAL is probably the most emblematic 
representation of the interplay between scarcity and abundance in the capital city. The central 
office of the water utility has an impressive glass and steel façade and is surrounded by an 
oasis of artificial waterfalls, swan ponds and irrigated greens. The estate extends for many 
kilometres along the two margins of the River Rímac and strict security prevents the access to 
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the watercourse (not allowed during our several visits to SEDAPAL in 2009, despite the 
request to visit the water treatment plants and other infrastructure works). All that 
dramatically contrasts with the dry and dusty neighbourhood of El Agustino, the crowded 
corner of Lima where the utility headquarter is located (see Figure 3). 
 
Figure 3. Contrast between the Headquarters of SEDAPAL and its Surroundings 
 
The water saga in different parts of the city suggests that scarcity remains directly associated 
with the limitation of political spaces and the discrimination of the low-income residents. The 
various expressions of water scarcity continue to be a major concern in Lima, but localised 
and circumstantial problems can only be properly understood when considering the totality of 
the experience of scarcity (including its physical, socioeconomic and political dimensions). 
That has certainly been the case in Huaycán, a self-administered community established in 
the East Cone in the 1980s in a steep slope area – between 500 and 900 metres above sea 
level – 20 km to the east of central Lima. Lack of water and sanitation has represented one of 
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the most significant failures of the experience of self-management in Huaycán (Interview, 
community leader, 29 Apr 2009). Precarious water services have been a central problem in 
Huaycán since its foundation and are often reinforced by the constant expansion of the 
settlement and unemployment affecting the majority of the population (Zambrano, 1997). 
Some rudimentary water infrastructure was achieved in the early days of community 
coordination, but gradually the settlement suffered from serious corruption, violence and the 
demobilisation influence of opportunistic politicians (Soto et al., 2005). At the time of our 
fieldwork, a significant proportion of the population still had to buy water from vendors and 
store it in plastic cylinders.  
The concrete and lived experience of water scarcity in the periphery represents, 
therefore, a robust challenge to the rhetoric associated with ongoing investment schemes such 
as APT. The profound consequences of water scarcity at the household level are vividly 
illustrated by the following statement of a resident in an area without water mains: 
 
“You know… I feel really embarrassed to say that my two daughters and my wife still 
have to defecate in such a precarious toilet [with no piped water]. (…) These people 
from APT came here and promised to bring water to our house, but so far I have seen 
nothing. I don’t think that it is going to happen. I am sceptical, I am 44 years old, 
from Lima – my wife is from Amazonas – and in my whole life I have never lived in 
a house with running water. It seems that we don’t deserve it, that we are not really 
entitled to have good, clean water” (Interview, 06 May 2009).  
 
Similar demonstrations of the difficult and enduring experience of water scarcity were 
found in Villa El Salvador (VES), in the South Cone of Lima, a ‘self-administered 
community’ (comunidad autogestionaria) (Zeballos, 1991). The history of VES started in 
1971 with the massive occupation of a plot of land and the immediate construction of homes, 
as is normal in rainless Lima, with mats of reeds (esteras). The population was then relocated 
and organised the community according ancient Peruvian traditions of common ownership of 
land and community work (faenas). Four decades after its establishment, VES still has some 
symbolic elements of the original mobilisation, but public participation became increasingly 
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fragmented, which inevitably affects the ability of the residents to complain about the quality 
of public services, such as water (Interview, former mayor of VES, 05 May 2009). The main 
consequence is that poverty is widespread in VES and a third of the households are still in a 
condition that is below inhabitability (García-Calderón et al., 2005). Even after the 
installation of pipelines, many dwellers have to wait for years to use the mains system due to 
lack of money to pay for the connection (Interview with residents, 2009). Figure 4 was taken 
during our fieldwork and shows a resident demonstrating how he stores and uses water 
previously purchased from a water tanker. This contrast between the physical availability of 
resources in the neighbourhood and the persistence of domestic shortage of water highlights 
the importance of addressing the totality of the experience of scarcity, which goes beyond 
aggregate statistics and the claims of policy-makers in order to encompass the perverse 
synergies between multiple manifestations of scarcity. 
 
 
Figure 4. Resident without Public Water Supply. 
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4. Conclusions: The Prospect of Persistent and Renewed Scarcities 
 
The persistent and multifaceted problems of water scarcity in Lima demonstrate the 
interconnections between various mechanisms of social exclusion that have composed the 
recent history of water management in the city. In order to understand the asymmetry of 
social and spatial opportunities behind the management of water, a non-essentialist 
conceptualisation of water scarcity was applied, which considered the relational and highly 
politicised basis of resource shortage and abundance. Rather than privileging physical and 
administrative factors, the analytical approach provided an examination inside the 
multidimensional nature of water scarcity and an excavation into the intricate barriers that 
prevent its resolution. Water scarcity cannot be understood as an isolated phenomenon, but as 
a process constantly reinserted in the totality of multiple urban scarcities of Lima. Instead of a 
purely material phenomenon, the condition of water scarcity reflects the long-term 
development of the capital city in relation to the rest of the country and the internal 
inequalities within the metropolitan area. While the old barriadas (as the slums of Lima are 
often called) remain areas of partial integration in the life of the city, the new barriadas 
propagate the same hierarchical organisation of space that presupposes renewed forms of 
scarcity. Likewise, despite the higher sums of capital that now circulate in the city due to the 
adoption of neoliberal policies of the last two decades, city expansion and economic growth 
have in effect accelerated the social presupposition of scarcity, as it is made evident by the 
spread of unemployment and job informality, the foundation of new neighbourhoods at 
significant distances from the city centre and the unresponsiveness to grassroots demands for 
water and public services.  
In the end, the geography of water scarcity in Lima offers a representative example of 
the complex interlinkages that constitute the contemporary megacity. The constant 
reinforcement of multiple scarcities – due to a combination of top-down strategies and the 
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manipulation of investments and infrastructure – has become the most basic experience in the 
daily struggle for survival in the periphery of such vast urban areas. In the case of the 
Peruvian capital, both city regeneration and water management have operated within the 
hegemonic asymmetries that dominate the political scene and, crucially, have reinforced 
disparities inherited from the previous historical periods. Even when low-income areas 
manage to secure concessions from public authorities, infrastructure and services are 
typically second-class. More significantly, the dialectical interplay between scarcity and 
abundance has been systematically used as a political device to handle expectations in the 
deprived areas of the capital. The deficiencies of the public water services are less the result 
of state failure than the convergence of powerful private interests in the organisation of urban 
water systems. Scarcity is instrumental for the circumstantial emergence of a circumstantial 
‘abundances’, at the price of maintaining long-established, multiple scarcities. As in the past, 
the recent responses to water problems are centred on the appropriation of scarcity as a 
productive force that serves dominant interests and political agendas. The ultimate conclusion 
is that, in order to search for genuine responses to the mounting water problems that trouble 
the low-income population, these multiple scarcities need to be considered in their totality, by 
acknowledging the uneven advantages accrued from the production of fluid scarcities and 
abundances in the city. 
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